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The Sino-Russian military relations have attracted a great deal of attention since the 21st century. 
They have strengthened into a strategic military partnership but did not evolve into a full military 
alliance. The goal of this paper is to analyse how has the international environment pushed Russia 
and China to improve their military relations, and to underline which factors prevented the 
formation of a full military alliance. This study relies on the neoclassical realist theory, considered 
to be a relevant theory to explain foreign policy behaviours. The Russian-Chinese military relations 
are explored through different indicators such as arms trade, military exercises, top brass meetings 
and border relations. The paper then analyses the international systemic factors that reunited Russia 
and China. It then goes down to the unit level of analysis to underline the factors that prevented a 
Sino-Russian official military alliance. These factors are the disagreement between Russian elites, 
the persistent security concerns from the Russian government and the security issues in Central 
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Russia and China announced in August 2020 that they are collaborating on a new generation 
of  non-nuclear submarines (Osborne 2020). This announcement is another example of  the 
growing collaboration between Russia and China in the military domain. This dissertation will study 
the Sino-Russian military relations to explain the main drivers of  their collaboration and to 
underline the specific factors that have prevented the formation of  a full military alliance. 
The Sino-Russian military relations have improved step-by-step since the mid-1980s. 
Russia’s rapprochement with China has been one of  the longest trends in Russian foreign policy. 
Since the end of  the Cold War, Russian-Chinese relations have improved regularly through several 
agreements. Their collaboration went from ‘good neighbourliness’ in the 1990s to the Treaty of  
Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001. Russia and China upgraded their 
relations in 2012 to the level of  a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership and coordination’, until 
raising again the partnership in 2016 to the level of  a “comprehensive strategic partnership of  
equality, mutual trust, mutual support, common prosperity and long-lasting friendship” (Embassy 
of  the People’s Republic of  China in the Republic of  Slovenia 2017, cited in Korolev 2018: 26). 
The Sino-Russian strategic partnership is one of  the most interesting phenomena to study 
nowadays in international relations, as this partnership has important repercussions for the 
equilibrium of  the international system. Russia and China are both great powers, they are nuclear 
states with permanent member seats at the United Nations Security Council. This study chooses 
to focus on their military relations as they are a good barometer of  the general level of  their bilateral 
relations, as it is a sensitive area of  collaboration between states, which it makes it adequate to 
measure the deepness of  their partnership. The study period of  focus is after 2008 until 2020. Prior 
to 2008, Russia and China collaborated on military issues, but in a very pragmatic and limited way. 
The changes in the international system pushed the two countries to forge a closer alliance. The 
downfall in Russia’s relations with the West was a big push for her rapprochement with China. 2008 
was the first step in this downfall with the Russo-Georgian War that antagonised Russia and the 
Western nations. After that, the Ukrainian 2014 crisis pushed them further away, leading Russia to 
focus on its eastern relations, especially with China. China, on her side, has been increasingly 
opposed to the US on a number of  issues, from their commercial war to the Asia-Pacific region or 
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their vision of  the international order. Russia and China have found their strategic interests to be 
converging, which has allowed them to build their strategic partnership on a solid foundation. Their 
partnership is characterized by their participation in various regional forums, economic relations, 
common foreign policy views, energy relations and their military relations. The treaty establishing 
their partnership is based on five main principles: “mutual respect of  state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence” (Weitz 2019: 5).  Their military relations are 
characterized by treaties, arms trade, joint military exercises, institutionalized meetings and 
cybersecurity relations among other instruments. The existence of  a common adversary – the 
United States (US) – has brought together  Russia and China closer, as they wish to establish a 
more multipolar world and to reverse the US hegemony that has prevailed in the international 
system since the end of  the Cold War. They have established some similar views about what the 
international order should be. Nevertheless, several factors have prevented their military relations 
of  deepening further into a full military alliance. The main questions that this study will answer are:  
how has the international environment pushed Russia and China to improve their military relations? 
How have domestic and regional factors hindered these relationships? 
The relations between Russia and China have been a focus of  interest for scholars all 
around the world for a long time. During the 20th century, Sino-Russian relations were studied 
through the scope of  the relations between the USSR and China’s People Republic, comparing the 
two different communist models and analysing the reasons of  the Sino-Russian Split. A focus of  
interest has emerged in the recent years on the subject, following the rapprochement of  Beijing 
and Moscow and the downfall of  Russia’s relations with the West. Within the existing literature on 
Sino-Russians relations, opinions are divided among authors about the nature of  the Russian-
Chinese relations and the resilience of  their strategic partnership. Some authors believe that the 
hurdles existing between China and Russia are too strong for the partnership to last long (Wilson 
2016). Various Chinese analysts have described the partnership as stable and profound, but as one 
which would not and should not transform into an alliance (Ying 2016). Experts also point to the 
fact that an alliance is unlikely to materialize between the two nations as their partnership is more 
based on practical considerations than on a similar long-term vision of  the world order (Bolt 2014). 
There are several scholars who remain cautious about the future of  this strategic partnership, 
noting the visible closeness of  the two countries while observing the remaining signs of  mistrust 
(Røseth 2018). Some other analysts believe in the opposite that despite the existing 
misunderstandings, the two countries will manage to overcome their differences and to build a 
strong and lasting relationship (Wishnick 2017). In fact, some scholars believe that just a few more 
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steps are needed before the formation of  a full alliance (Korolev 2018, Blank 2016). Analysts note 
the impact of  the systemic pressure on the Chinese-Russian relations, arguing that their level of  
cooperation will depend on the pressure from the United States (US) (Korolev and Portyakov 
2018). In definitive, scholars are divided about the nature and the future of  the Sino-Russian 
military relations. The existing studies often insist rather on the systemic factors or the internal 
factors to explain the current state of  China’s and Russia’s military relations. It is sometimes difficult 
to find analyses attached solidly to an international relations theory about these questions, 
explaining both the systemic incentives of  the relations and the unit-level variables, to explain the 
foreign policy behaviour of  the countries. This article wishes to contribute to fill this gap and to 
advance the neoclassical realist framework as a relevant theory of  international relations, by 
analysing how the pressure of  the international system interacts with the unit-level factors to 
influence the formation of  a specific foreign policy. 
This study aims to underline the factors that have prevented the formation of  a military 
alliance by using the neoclassical realist framework. As mentioned above, Russia and China are 
both great powers and are thus heavily influenced by the trends in the international system. A 
systemic analysis is necessary to understand the positions of  Moscow and Beijing. They also have 
complicated internal politics and complex geopolitical environments that require a unit-level 
analysis to complete the systemic one. Systemic-level and unit-level analysis can be done through 
the prism of  neoclassical realism. The Sino-Russian military relations (the dependent variable) are 
influenced by the pressure and changes from the anarchic international environment (the 
independent variable). This systemic factor is counteracted by unit-level factors that shape the 
foreign policy behaviour of  the states in another direction. These unit-level factors are 
disagreement between Russian elites, persistent security concerns from the Russian government, 
and security issues in Central Asia. Neoclassical realism acknowledges that internal and regional 
factors can have an impact on the formation of  a state’s foreign policy. The study will analyse how 
the internal politics of  the Kremlin have influenced the formation of  Russia’s foreign policy. The 
persistent security concerns from the Russian government refer to the internal situation of  Russia 
and the disparities that exist between the regions, especially in the East, as well as other factors 
such as the nuclear issue, the Chinese military, the Russian and Chinese territorial claims, and 
China’s internal situation. 
This research is going to use the research design of  single-case study – the effects of  
systemic pressure and the unit-level factors on the Sino-Russian military relations. The goal is to 
explain the causes of  the level of  the Sino-Russian strategic partnership and how it evolves. This 
single case study is going to be a hypothesis generating case study, as I will study an event and 
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search to explain it by determining its causes and roots. This study is going to use both qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The Russian-Chinese military relations will be operationalized by 
measuring the arms sales relationship, the numbers of  joint military exercises, the border relations 
and top-brass meetings. The data comes from official Russian documents, secondary literature, 
news material. The limits of  this study are that it cannot explore all the aspects of  the Russian-
Chinese strategic partnership and chose to focus on military relations. Plus, even though most of  
the data is available and declared by the governments, there is still the possibility that some might 
be classified or unavailable for national security reasons. Another limit of  this study is that, as it 
cannot explore everything, it will mainly focus on the Russian side and explore the military relations 
mostly at a state-to-state level. 
The analysis starts by defining the analytical structure of  the study, that is neoclassical 
realism. After, I define the level of  the Sino-Russian military relations (the dependant variable). 
Then, I examine how the pressure and changes from the international system (the independent 
variable) influence the Russia-China military relations. The analysis continues by underlining how 
the disagreement between Russian elites, the persistent security concerns from the Russian 
government and the security issues in Central Asia (the intervening variables) have prevented the 
















Chapter I. Analytical structure: neoclassical realism 
 
The first chapter of  this study will describe the theoretical structure in which the study 
inscribes herself. 
Realism is not a unique theory but more a research program about the main factors and 
processes explaining the international relations. Numerous sub-schools exist within realism, as 
neorealism or neoclassical realism. Two famous founding books of  realism are The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis (Carr 1939) and Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau 1948). Realist theories as well as their 
sub-school are built on different postulates, the main ones are the following. For realist theories, 
the building block of  the international system are sovereign states, despite the existence of  non-
state actors like international organisations or non-governmental organisations. They evolve in an 
international system that is characterized by its anarchy and its instability. This anarchy provokes 
security dilemmas for states, pushing them in a quest of  power to ensure their security. Here realists 
divide between two groups, those who think that states only seek to survive, so that they will adopt 
a defensive realism by looking to preserve their territory and sovereignty. Other realists think that 
states want to maximise their power to ensure their security, pushing them into a global competition 
for wealth, power and resources. These are the offensive realists. Realism is also popular in the 
Chinese traditional strategic culture. One of  the oldest Chinese strategic books is The Art of  War 
by Sun Tzu (5th century B.C). 
 Neoclassical realism is a sub-school of  neorealism. This well-known school of  
international relations postulates that the international system is anarchic and that the priority of  
states is survival. States fight for power and resources under the pressure of  the anarchic 
international environment (Kropatcheva 2018: 43). The main point of  neorealism is that it insists 
in the importance of  the international balance of  power on the behaviour of  states. However, 
neorealism aims more to explain general theories within the international system and their global 
effects, rather than a specific foreign policy behaviour. This is often referred to as the black box of  
neorealism, as it does not study the internal conditions of  states. (Kropatcheva 2018: 45). 
As the goal of  this study is to explain a particular foreign policy behaviour and not to make 
general assumptions, neoclassical realism is particularly convenient here. As in neorealism, the 
pressure of  the anarchic international system (the independent variable) is viewed as the main 
explanatory factor of  the foreign policy of  states. States, in function of  the relative material power 
capabilities and their position within the international structure, try to maximize their power to 
have the maximum chances of  survival. However, neoclassical realists then explore the internal 
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conditions of  states to see how they react to the systemic pressure (Rose 1998: 154). Neoclassical 
realism explores variables from different levels to see how they interplay between each other and 
how they influence the foreign policy of  states. A neoclassical analyst study thus begins by defining 
a behavioural model that a state would have if  only the systemic level was taken into account. Then, 
it goes to the unit-level, also named as state-level, to see how the internal factors can influence the 
systemic factors (Korolev and Portyakov, 2018: 416). These internal factors (the intervening 
variables) can be domestic factors (power division within the elites, ideology, personality of  the 
leaders, etc) or geopolitical features related to the immediate geopolitical neighbourhood. The 
systemic factor is considered the most important one, but the innovation of  neoclassical realism is 
that it also considers that domestic factors can have an influence on the foreign policy of  a state 
either by reinforcing or counteracting the systemic incentives (Kropatcheva 2018: 46). It is 
particularly useful to explain ambivalent behaviours such as in this study. 
 A neoclassical realist analysis is acutely adapted to explain the Sino-Russian military 
relations. Russia’s foreign policy objectives have often been explained through the scope of  realist 
concepts: expansion, the power and status aspirations, the Near Abroad policy and concept of  
zones of  influence, the reliance on hard power and others. Russia and China can be both described 
as great powers with primary role in international affairs. As an example, they both have a 
permanent seat the United Nations Security Council. The systemic pressure is thus of  primary 
importance to study if  an explanation of  their foreign policy wants to be credible. However, due 
to their size and internal complexity, as well as their immediate geopolitical neighbourhood, their 
internal factors have to be taken into account to explain their international policy the most 
accurately possible. If  only the systemic factors or the unit levels were analysed, it would not be 
sufficient to correctly explain their foreign policy. 
This analysis starts by the study of  the systemic incentives on the foreign policy behaviour 
of  Russia towards China. The pressure and changes of  the anarchic international environment (the 
independent variable), if  it was the only factor taken into account, would make one suggest that 
Russia would have deepened its military relations with China, possibly conclude a military alliance. 
However, this has not happened, as the study of  the internal factors (intervening variables) helps 
to understand. The domestic factors in Russia have created a counterincentive to the systemic 
factors and prevented the formation of  a formal military alliance. The disagreement between 
Russian elites, the persistent security concerns from the Russian government and the security issues 
in Central Asia (the intervening variables), have resulted in the formation of  ambivalent military 
relations between Russia and China, as this study will further demonstrate. The analytical structure 
of  this study can be illustrated with the schema below. 
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Chapter II.  A strategic ambivalence: Sino-Russian military relations 
 
The first step of the analysis is to define the dependant variable, that is the level of the Sino-
Russian military relations. 
 
Section 1) The Sino-Russian strategic partnership at the official level 
 
Since the breaking of  the political relations between the Union of  Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) and the People’s Republic of  China (PRC), also known as the Sino-Soviet split (1956-1966), 
the bilateral relations between Moscow and Beijing have greatly improved. This is particularly 
noticeable after 2008. Before this date, even though Russia and China were linked by a strategic 
cooperative partnership since 1996, some mistrust remained persistent between the two great 
powers. Moscow was worried about the rapid growth of  China’s capabilities, especially in military 
and economic terms. The situation of  the Russian Far East particularly worried the Kremlin, due 
to its small population, Chinese working immigration and its relative defencelessness (Røseth 2018: 
3). In 2008 the Russo-Georgian war marked a significant deterioration in Russia’s relations with the 
Western world. The same year, China and Russia signed an action plan to improve their relations 
based on the treaty of  2001 (Bolt 2014: 48). Finally, in 2011 their bilateral relations received the 
level of  a “comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership”. Moscow’s and Beijing’s bilateral 
military relations are a good barometer of  their level of  cooperation in general, as questions relative 
to national security are an area to which the Kremlin is particularly attentive. According to Tom 
Røseth, a strategic partnership “is a broad, long-term relationship based on trust that allows for in 
order to obtain benefits through the partnership, but may imply concerns about the other’s relative 
power” (Røseth 2018: 3). The strategic partnership is in-between neutral relations and a formal 
military alliance. 
This increased cooperation can be observed in the official declarations and the treaties 
signed. By looking at the official speeches, the Sino-Russian military relations seem to be under a 
bright sky. Xi Jinping, the Chinese president, characterized the relations between Russia and China 
as being at the highest level in 70 years (TASS 2019b). The Russian strategic documents do not 
mention potential threats coming from the Chinese side. The official documents, like the National 
Security Strategy (2015) and the Military Doctrine (2014) stated the US and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) as being the main threat for Russia. Concerning China, Russia 
officially does not consider Beijing as a national security menace and rather emphasizes the 
opportunities of  collaboration with her partner (The Military Doctrine of  the Russian Federation 
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of  2014). Russia’s image in China is also positive, Moscow does not appear as a threat in the Chinese 
discourse or publications. China neither does not consider Russia as an imminent threat or in a 
negative aspect (Jinghan and al. 2015: 264). 
The Chinese-Russian strategic partnership has been characterized by regular meetings by 
the top leaders, cooperation on international issues, energy and military cooperation, economic 
agreements and more. As many as nearly fifty agreements have been signed by the two countries 
since 2001 (Bolt 2014: 50). The conflict in Ukraine in 2014 further parted away Russia and the 
West. Their relations came down to an unprecedented level since the end of  the Cold War. Russia 
proclaimed a “turn to East” in 2014, officially giving priority to China over Europe. Another 
important treaty between the two countries was signed in 2015: the Sino-Russian Cybersecurity 
Agreement. One of  the main components of  this agreement is a mutual assurance of  non-
aggression in cyberspace (Nocetti 2018: 192). Moreover, on international security issues Moscow 
and Beijing have coordinated their responses. For example, they both vocally opposed the presence 
of  the US’s THAAD missile system in South Korea. They were also against the American missile 
shields in Europe (Kuhrt 2018: 264). Thus, the official declarations and the treaties signed in their 
overwhelming majority aim to demonstrate a good level of  military relations between Russia and 
China, giving the impression of  reliable partners. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 
Russia and China are not formally allies, as the Treaty of  Good Neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation of  2001 does not contain a defence clause (Røseth 2018: 10). Another important 
observation is that the Foreign Policy Concept published by Russia in 2016 voices doubts about 
whether the military alliances are really useful to solve the modern-day challenges (Russian Foreign 
Policy Concept 2016). 
 
Section 2) Russo-Chinese military cooperation on the ground 
 
The official discourses and the treaties have been followed by an increased military 
cooperation on the ground. The level of  military relations can be measured with arms trade, top 
brass meetings, bilateral exercises, and border relations. The measurements of  the military relations 
show that they globally have followed the official discourse and have generally improved. However, 
some attitudes from Russia and China demonstrate that there is still some mistrust between them 




➢ Arms trade: 
The first measurement used to evaluate the level of  the Russian-Chinese military relations 
is the arms trade. Chinese leaders, on their long-term development plans for China, have sought to 
develop the country’s military for several decades. In this context during the 1990s China became 
the main client of  Russia’s military industry. After the fall of  the USSR, Russia saw her revenues 
diminish drastically and was in need of  revenues. China started to buy a lot of  Russian weapons, 
being banned from the Western arms trade, and Russia was eager to sell its weapons to Beijing. 
The arms sold were mainly standard weapons in large quantities. Among these weapons, there was 
missile systems, helicopters, SU-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, destroyers and others (Bolt 2014: 56). 
Russia traditionally refused to sell her more advanced weapons systems to China and was reluctant 
to technology and research transfer. Among different reasons, the Kremlin feared that China would 
do reverse-engineering on its most advanced weapons systems, which would have allowed China 
to produce its own weapons. Moscow was also worried about keeping a relative balance of  power 
in Asia. In this perspective, India and Vietnam were the privileged recipients of  Russian technology 
transfers during the 2000s, over China (Røseth 2018: 6). Arms sales dropped in 2005, dropped 
again in 2008 due to the financial crisis, as China was now able to produce most of  the weapons 
she used to purchase from Russia. The ones Beijing wanted to buy, the most advanced weapons 
systems, Moscow was not yet ready to sell them. In 2005 Russia’s arms exports to China were worth 
3.2 billion US$. Between 2010 and 2018 Russian arms exports to China had dropped to an average 
of  816 million US$ per year (https://chinapower.csis.org/). However, following the degradation of  
Russia’s relations with the West in 2014 due to the Ukrainian crisis, things began to change. The 
Russian arms exports to China went under a change, the market moved from quantity to quality. 
Russia agreed to sell to China her most advanced weapons systems such as S-400 missile defence 
systems or SU-35 fighter jets (Kuhrt 2018: 262). Russia thus favoured China over its traditional 
Asian partners, India and Vietnam. These new Russian weapons have been crucial for China’s air 
defence and naval defence. China wants to protect access to her territorial waters and sensitive 
areas such as the South East China Sea. The SU-35 fighter jets have increased the Chinese army’s 
defence capabilities against the American navy ships (Weitz 2019: 2). This acceptance from 
Moscow to proceed to technology transfer to China is a consequence of  their improved strategic 
partnership. It shows that a certain level of  trust has been attained. Arms trade indicates a good 
level of  the Sino-Russian military relations. 
 
➢ Top brass meetings: 
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Top brass meetings will be used as the second measurement to define the level of  Moscow’s 
and Beijing’s military relations. The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is characterised by 
frequent meetings each year between each country’s top officials. The top brass meetings have 
become more organised, more frequent and more institutionalized. They allow the Russian officials 
and their Chinese counterparts to discuss and collaborate on transnational issues, to issue joints 
statements and learn more about each other (Weitz 2019: 3). The foreign ministers, prime ministers 
and chief  of  states have met regularly in the past years and continue to do so. Since Xi Jinping 
became the Chinese president in 2013, the foreign leader he encountered the most is Vladimir 
Putin. From 2013 to 2019 they met more than 30 times. Xi Jinping said about Putin: “He is my 
best and bosom friend. I cherish dearly our deep friendship.” (TASS 2019a). Moreover, numerous 
Russian military personnel have studied at the National Défense University of  China, while their 
Chinese counterparts came to Russian faculties to learn too (Fu 2016: 98). The military contacts 
between Russia and China are of  an average of  30 top brass meetings per year. Besides Pakistan, 
Russia is the only country with whom China has such a military cooperation. The main bilateral 
military meetings between Moscow and Beijing are at the number of  4: 
1. “The Mechanism of  Regular Meetings between the Defence Ministers of  Russia and 
China”. The Chinese and Russian defence ministers meet once a year to exchange and coordinate 
their views about international security. 
2. “The Mechanism of  Annual Strategic Consultation among Chiefs of  the General Staff ” 
3. “Russia-China Consultation on National Security Issues” 
4. “The China-Russia Northeast Asia Security Dialogue” (Korolev 2018) 
These meetings have grown both in frequency and in deeper cooperation. They serve as an 
indicator of  good military relations between Russia and China. 
 
➢ Military exercises: 
Military exercises are another indicator that is useful to measure the level of  the Sino-
Russian military relations. Russia and China have conducted bilateral military exercises in the past 
years, both on land and on the sea. The goals of  these joint military exercises are to enhance their 
interoperability, to learn new techniques, to improve each other’s operational interoperability. The 
Chinese military in particular needs to train in these large exercises as China has not been engaged 
in any big war abroad since World War 2 (Weitz 2019: 3). 
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Their first combined exercises were organised through the framework of  the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the multilateral organisation of  which they are both members. 
Beijing and Moscow collaborate within the SCO to maintain security in Central Asia and fight 
separatism and terrorism. In 2005 Russia and China held the Peace Mission exercises, which were 
officially about fighting terrorism. However, given the number of  soldiers and military involved, 
some analysts pointed out that it was also a demonstration of  force to the other Asian states (Bolt 
2014: 58). The level of  military cooperation on these land exercises, which have been conducted 
several times since 2005, was quite low. Russia and China started a new type of  naval exercise in 
2012: The Joint Sean exercise. These exercises were held annually in the Southern Asian Seas, for 
example in the Sea of  Japan in 2013 and in the South China Sea in 2016 (Korolev 2018: 35). They 
are particularly relevant for China, as Beijing seeks to expand her influence in the Asian seas and 
has several maritime disputes with other Asian states. China has territorial claims on several 
archipelagos of  the South China Sea, like the Parcels Islands, and is in conflict over these territories 
with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia among other states. The fact that Russia 
agreed to organise the Joint Sea exercises in these locations indicates a stronger level of  military 
cooperation than before, as it risks appearing like a political support to China. However, Russia has 
not openly supported China on these disputes and preferred to remain neutral (Bolt 2014: 58). It 
appeared that for Moscow the message conveyed in these exercises was more an opposition to the 
US hegemony than an approval of  Chinese territorial claims (Korolev and Portyakov, 2018: 423). 
The level of  military cooperation under these bilateral maritime exercises, even if  it remains under 
the political anticipations, corresponds to improved military collaboration. Indeed, information 
exchanged within maritime exercises is quite sensitive and complex (Korolev 2018: 36). The Joint 
Sea exercises have raised concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, notably among Russia’s other partners 
in Southern Asia. It can be considered as another signal that Russia’s Pivot to Asia also means that 
priority is given to China by Russia over its traditional Asian partners such as Vietnam. China also 
took part in the 2018 Vostok military exercise, which showed a certain degree of  cooperation as 
this exercise was organised by the Russian Eastern Military District, and Eastern Siberia is a 
sensitive area for Moscow in its relations with China. Russia was for a long time suspicious about 
China’s intentions in this region, so inviting the Chinese army in this exercise is an important signal 
for the Russian military. 
However, even if  their bilateral exercises have been held more frequently and with more 
inter-operability, Russia and China also held unilateral military exercises that demonstrate that there 
is still a degree of  upholding between them and that they are not full allies. In particular, in 2013 a 
few months after the Joint Sea exercise, Russia held its biggest military exercise since 1991. It took 
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place in the Russian Far East, not very far from the Chinese border. More than 160 000 troops 
took part to the exercise, as well as cruisers from the Pacific Fleet (Bolt 2014: 58). The goal of  this 
unilateral exercise was to show the readiness and preparation of  the Russian armed forces to defend 
the Eastern territories. Moscow also wanted to demonstrate its independence and the fact that 
Russia was ready to defend its territories against any enemy, including China. Moreover, Russia held 
also the Vostok military exercise of  2014 in the Russian Far East. The Russian armed forces trained 
to move quickly on long distances, with some scenarios that were mainly general but could also 
include China as a threat (Røseth 2018: 14). As for China, some military exercises included in their 
scenario a confrontation with more equipped enemy (more technology and with nuclear forces). 
This scenario can include Russia. Hence, Russia cooperates with China in several land and maritime 
exercises, sharing knowledge and demonstrating their good relations. However, the unilateral 
military exercises held by Russia demonstrate that the Russian military continues to include the 
possibility of  a Chinese threat in its scenarios and do not fully trust Beijing.  The military exercises 
of  Russia and China demonstrate that their military relations are sometimes cooperative but other 
times tainted with mistrust. Thus, they can be defined as ambivalent. 
 
➢ Border relations: 
Finally, border relations are also an indicator of  the Sino-Russian military relations. The 
border between Russia and China was heavily militarized during the USSR period, following the 
Sino-Soviet split. An undeclared border conflict eventually opposed the two communist countries 
in 1969. Since the fall of  the USSR, Moscow and Beijing have been working to solve this border 
dispute. A first bilateral agreement was signed in 1997 which solved issues about the Eastern side 
of  the border. It was followed by a Complementary Agreement in 2004 which solved the last border 
dispute and marked the resolution of  the border issue between Russian and China (The New York 
Times 2004). Apart from this border demarcation, Russia and China sought to de-militarise partially 
the border where numerous soldiers were stationed during the Cold War. Between 1993 and 2016, 
the Russian armed forces stationed near the border went down from 290 000 to 65 000 military 
personnel. China also reduced her arm forces on her side of  the border (Røseth 2018: 12). Since 
2008 the Russian army has been under some big modifications. Russia reorganised and modernized 
her army in order to adapt it to the modern-day challenges. The Maritime Doctrine of  2015 defines 
as a strategic objective the reinforcement of  the Pacific Fleet, the key to Russia’s power in the 
Pacific. Thus, Russia has strengthened her naval forces in Vladivostok, while underpinning her 
military forces in the Far Eastern district, next to the border (Kuhrt 2018: 261). This appears to be 
slightly in contradiction with the official declarations which, as mentioned before, do not state 
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China as a threat. While the leaders emphasize regularly how good the bilateral relations are, the 
facts on the ground tend to show that there is still a degree of  distrust between the two countries. 
The Russian deployment of  armed forces next to the Chinese border shows that the Kremlin is 
still attentive to not lower its defence against China. For example, in 2017 the Russian military 
deployed S-400 systems in the Russian Far East, officially to protect the Pacific Fleet from an 
exterior attack and as an answer to the instability provoked by the North Korean situation, but this 
could also be a strengthening of  the local Russian army against China and a signal that Moscow is 
not lessening its guard (Stronski and Ng, 2018: 24). 
Moreover, the Far Eastern District forces, reinforced and reorganised, have participated in 
some unilateral exercises that can include China within their scenarios. Thus, even if  the border 
dispute has been solved and the total number of  troops stationed near the border has been reduced, 
in the past years Russia has reinforced her military in the Far East. The facts appear to be in 
opposition to the official narrative, which indicates that by considering the border relations, the 
Sino-Russian military relations appear to be ambivalent. 
The arms trade and the top-brass meetings indicate a strong level of  military cooperation, 
that has increased since 2008 and continues to increase. Russia has shown China trust by selling its 
most advanced weapons, and the meetings have grown both in frequency and number. As for the 
bilateral exercises and the border relations, there are too some elements of  strong collaboration 
between Moscow and Beijing. However, some moves on the ground show that there is still mistrust 
from the Russian side and contradict the official story. Thus, the military relations can be defined 
as ambivalent. 
 
Section 3: Hybrid warfare operations, a possible future Sino-Russian military 
cooperation 
 
This section will cover hybrid warfare operations, as it has become an integral part of  the 
military studies today. 
Nowadays, large direct military conflicts between great powers are unlikely to happen, 
particularly due to the nuclear dissuasion. Great powers mostly compete in third countries, either 
through military operations in proxy wars, or in non-military operations involving the use of  
economy or other means of  competition. These new form of  mixed operations as been named 
hybrid warfare. Frank G. Hoffman has defined hybrid warfare as “any adversary that simultaneously 
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and adaptively employs a fused mix of  conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and 
criminal behaviour in the battle space to obtain their political objectives” (Hoffman 2009, cited in 
Cordesman 2020: 3). Hybrid warfare therefore means the use of  different methods, conventional 
tactics as well as unconventional ones, in different locations and spaces, to politically influence an 
event or an opponent. The Russian General Valery Gerasimov  described the hybrid warfare in 
these words: “The focus of  applied methods of  conflict has altered in the direction of  the broad 
use of  political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures – applied 
in coordination with the protest potential of  the population. All this supplemented by military 
means of  a concealed character, including carrying out actions of  informational conflict and the 
actions of  special operations forces” (Gerasimov 2013, cited in Cordesman: 4). Gray zone 
operations have been increasingly used in the past years by the great powers (principally the US, 
Russia and China) to compete with each other without requiring the use of  armed forces. They 
especially happen in the cyberspace and in information warfare, using the new Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) to destabilize a foreign country by influencing on her internal 
affairs or her public opinion. 
Russia has accused the US of  launching hybrid warfare operations against her, through 
Washington’s regime change policy in the post-soviet space and the suspected information war 
against Moscow. The American foreign policy is perceived in Russia as aimed to destabilize the 
country through unconventional and hidden tactics, notably by organizing and supporting popular 
revolutions movements around Russia’s territory, to destabilize the Russian political regime. The 
Russian military worked to integrate these perceived threats into its new military doctrine (Simons 
2018: 211). The Kremlin believes that Russia is in a state of  neither war or peace with the West, an 
intermediate state where each side will try by any means to discredit and weaken the other side. 
Information warfare is an essential part of  this war. The US and Russia have regularly accused each 
other of  propagating fake news. The Russian media has often denounced the ‘Russophobia’ that 
they believe to be widespread in American politics and society. Information has become a political 
tool for global influence. This new vision of  information has been integrated by the Russian 
government in the new Military Doctrine of  the Russian Federation published in 2014. The 
Doctrine considers information as being a fundamental part of  the new forms of  conflicts and as 
a part of  the national security instruments. According to the Military Doctrine, information can be 
used as a way to reach directly to a country’s population, to form in its public opinion a negative 
opinion of  the political leaders and to encourage mass protests and even revolutions. Information 
is thus treated as a threat that needs to be controlled and included in Russia’s military tools (The 
Military Doctrine of  the Russian Federation of  2014). The cyberspace has become an arena where 
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great powers continue their competition for global hegemony, leading to the militarization of  
information. Russia sees ICTS and the cyberspace as a tool for other countries to threaten its 
political regime, its regional stability and its sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, Russia has also used gray zone actions to compete against its political 
opponents. In February 2017 Information Troops were officially created in Russia, regrouping 
various profiles such as hackers, cybersecurity experts and information experts. Russia has used the 
cyberspace and information warfare, in addition to traditional foreign policy tools such as the 
military, to launch cyberattacks in other countries or influence their public opinions, engaging 
herself  in the competition for power in the cyberspace (Nocetti 2018: 189). Coercive diplomacy is 
an essential tool for Russia. Charles Ziegler defines coercive diplomacy as “efforts to persuade an 
opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon” (Ziegler 2018: 123). 
Moscow uses coercive diplomacy as a tool in its gray zones actions, mainly through disinformation 
campaigns or cyber-attacks. 
The US hegemony on the Internet has been criticized by many nations, including Russia 
and China. Most of  the internet resources are in fact based in the US, such as the domain names 
systems, the major infrastructures or the capacity to regulate the web that is mostly under control 
of  the American government. The American government has been under the fire of  critics also 
because while promoting the deregulation and freedom of  the Internet, security agencies such as 
the Central Information Agency (CIA) or the National Security Agency (NSA) have been collecting 
data about people in the US as well as about foreign citizens and governments, as revealed through 
the Edward Snowden scandal, the NSA’s former employee. Russia felt the dominance of  the big 
US companies over the Internet as a threat for her national security (Nocetti 2018: 188). In reaction 
to these perceived threats, Russia launched her own hybrid warfare campaigns. It is important to 
note that in the cyberspace and the ‘cyber war” between the US, Russia and China, every story has 
different versions according to its narrator, as each country has accused the other of  organising 
disinformation campaigns and propagating fake news. 
Hybrid warfare operations involve a large spectrum of  operations that imply various means 
of  organisation. They can be orchestrated on a governmental level or by lower actors or 
organisations. An American report has listed Russia’s main gray zones actions, and established that 
Russia and China coordinated cyber actions such as disinformation or propaganda to discredit the 
US internationally or to influence the public opinions of  the US’s allies, such as in Eastern Europe 
country or the post-soviet space. These tactics are called aktivnye meropriyatiya in Russian. According 
to this report, Russia has launched several hybrid warfare campaigns around the world to target the 
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US influence and tarnish their image. Moscow has also, still according to this report, collaborated 
with China within the SCO to keep the Central Asian states under Russian and Chinese influence 
and away from the US (Cordesman 2020). 
 
Figure 2: Russian hybrid warfare operations around the world  
Russia’s campaign in the USA involves attempts of  influencing the 2016 election by creating 
fake accounts on Twitter and Facebook, in order to delegitimize the American democratic system 
and divide the public opinion. In China, Russia’s actions aim not to destabilize the regime but on 
the contrary to consolidate ties with Beijing in order to counteract the US hegemony in the world 
(Cordesman 2020). Again, such hybrid warfare campaigns are not the prerogative of  Russia, as the 
US and China, along with other great or regional powers, have too been involved hybrid warfare 
operations. 
Therefore, the cyberspace is nowadays seen as an essential component of  national security 
policies. It is the fourth battleground where great powers compete for influence and power, along 
with the earth, the sea and the sky. As evoked before, as the Internet is mostly dominated by US 
companies and norms, Russia and China have started to cooperate in recent years in the field of  
cybersecurity, as a part of  their strategic partnership and to fight back US hegemony. One of  the 
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organisations through which they have collaborated in cybersecurity is within the SCO. They are 
required within the SCO to share their information and their cyberspace policies. Moscow and 
Beijing have used the SCO to promote an Internet based on state sovereignty rather than freedom. 
Another important step in hybrid warfare collaboration between Russia and China is their 
cybersecurity deal signed in 2015. The main aspects of  the deal are a clause of  non-aggression in 
the cyberspace and the promotion of  cyber-sovereignty (Nocetti 2018: 192). As the international 
community has not yet managed to agree on a global text about cybersecurity, this deal can be seen 
as a rapprochement of  the Russian and Chinese cybersecurity policies and views. They both 
consider information security as a full part of  the cybersecurity and insist more on the necessity to 
control the information for national security interests rather than letting the information circulate 
without barriers on the Internet in the name of  freedom. Thus, Russia and China have converging 
views about how the Internet should be regulated, a vision which is opposed to the US conception 
of  the Internet and that has brought them together closer in cybersecurity cooperation. 
At the same time, Russia has not been the main priority for the Chinese cyber policy. China 
also signed in 2015 a non-aggression deal with the US about the cyberspace. The US are the priority 
for Beijing’s cybersecurity policy, and the cyber competition is more played between the US and 
China rather than the US and Russia, which has raised some concerns in Moscow. On cybersecurity 
issues, Moscow and Beijing have collaborated on a number of  issues, creating the conditions for a 
further cooperation in this domain. But this collaboration has not yet been pushed to the level of  
a shared cyber policy and this does not appear to be the priority in Beijing. Consequently, as the 
cyberspace is a fundamental component of  military policies, the evolution of  the Sino-Russian 
military collaboration on this subject is an indicator that needs to be followed to assess the 
evolution of  their general military collaboration. As for now, Moscow and Beijing have collaborated 










Chapter III.  Pushed together: Sino-Russian relations and the international 
environment 
 
The second step in the neoclassical realist approach is to analyse the influence of  the 
independent variable on the dependant variable, that is the effect of  the pressure and changes of  
the anarchic international environment  on the level of  China and Russia’s military relations. 
 
Section 1) The 21st century and the global competition for power and 
security 
 
Neoclassical realism, as structural realism, postulates that the international system is 
characterized by anarchy. States constitute the main entities of  the international system, 
notwithstanding the emergence of  non-state actors due to globalization and the growing 
importance of  international economy. Evolving under an environment ruled by anarchy, the states 
try to maximise their security and to accumulate as much power as they can. The distribution of  
power is fundamental in realist theories, as it will influence the international behaviour of  states. 
The distribution of  power between the states is measured with hard power indicators such as the 
GDP or military spending. States will compete in the international arena for power. If  one state 
accumulates too much power, other states can form an alliance to reverse the unequal distribution 
of  power and protect themselves. States will thus engage in balance of  power to re-establish the 
equilibrium if  one state becomes too powerful compared to the other ones. Since the end of  the 
Cold War, during the 1990s and the 2000s the international system has been characterized by the 
dominance of  the US. This situation is called unipolarity, which is a “global systemic structure 
constituted by the material balance of  power based on relative military and long-term 
technological/economic capabilities” (Barkanov 2018: 148). In 2000, Kenneth Waltz predicted that 
the global powers would try to reverse this equilibrium and to counter-balance the US’s power by 
forming alliances between each other (external balancing) or enhancing their internal resources 
(internal balancing) (Waltz 2000: 28-29, cited in Korolyev and Portyakov 2018: 424). The only states 
able to engage into the balance of  power are great powers, as the power and resources necessary 
to involve into such a competition are important. Russia and China are both great powers in the 
international system and, as Korolev defines them “they are, in fact, important building blocks of  
that system” (Korolev 2018: 27).  After the fall of  the Soviet Union, Russia lost its stature as a 
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global superpower and the international system undertook a transformation: it went from a bipolar 
to a unipolar system. During the 1990s Russia was mainly focused on improving her internal 
situation, as her economy was struggling to recover and to transform into a market economy. 
Russia’s situation started to improve in the 2000s and Moscow progressively re-engaged on the 
international stage. Russia can be defined as a great power. Russia is one of  the five officially 
recognised nuclear-weapon states in the world. In 2019 Russia had an estimate of  6.490 nuclear 
warheads, while the USA had an estimate of  6.185 nuclear warheads, making Russia the country 
with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world (Kristensen and Korda, 2019). Russia is also one the 
five permanent members of  the United Nations Security Council. As for China, the country was 
focused on developing its economy during the 1990s and 2000s and took a more active role in 
international affairs as her economy grew to be one of  the world’s largest economies. China too 
can be defined as a great power: China is also recognised as one of  the nuclear-weapon states and 
has a permanent seat at the United Nations in the world. Moreover, in 2014 China had a GDP in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) of  $18 344.50 billion. The same year, the USA had a GDP (PPP) 
of  $17 521.7 billion (Statistics Times 2019). This economic wealth (China is ranked as the first or 
the second largest economy in the world depending on the measurements) is another indicator of  
China’s status as a great power. 
Since the end of  the 2000s, a series of  events has deteriorated even more Russia’s relations 
with the West: the Russo-Georgian war of  2012, the war in Syria since 2011 and the Ukrainian 
crisis in 2014. When Vladimir Putin came back to power in 2012, he proclaimed for his third term 
a new vision of  Russia in civilisational terms. As Tsygankov writes it, “Putin’s new vision of  Russia 
as a state-civilisation with distinct interests and values since 2012 sought to compensate for the 
weaknesses of  Medvedev’s cooperative and West-centric approach” (Tsygankov 2016; 28, cited in 
Simons 2018: 203). Russia has engaged in a geopolitical competition with the US, with the 
objectives of  restoring her regional power, a respect of  her interests in her zone of  influence and 
her recognition of  her status as a global power. China is also engaged on a commercial war with 
the US, as well as a geopolitical competition for influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United 
States are fighting to retain their position as the unique superpower and to stay in the situation of  
unipolarity that has benefited them since the end of  the Cold War. The US cannot ignore however 
the emergence of  other great powers, principally Russia and China, that contest the international 
order as it is established. The geopolitical competition has become even more intense since the 
Ukrainian crisis of  2014. The United States still retain their position of  world leader and 
superpower, as neither China or Russia or any other country has the capabilities to take over this 
role or to become a second superpower, which would take the world back to a situation of  
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bipolarity. Nevertheless, China and Russia have engaged in a hard balancing with the United Sates, 
challenging the United States’ hegemony and demanding a more multipolar world. The character 
of  international relations is changing, as Simons resumes it well: “within-structure processes means 
unbalanced unipolarity is giving way to balanced unipolarity” (Simons 2018: 148). 
The changes in the international environment have pushed together Russia and China, but 
also the level of  pressure that they feel from the same environment. Great powers are likely to 
form a close relationship or an alliance when they feel existential threats by another great power. 
China and Russia are only susceptible to feel threatened on such a level by the United States, so to 
understand their behaviour between each other it is important to observe their relations with the 
United States (Korolev 2018: 27). Russia as well as China see their main threat as coming from the 
United States (and NATO). As mentioned before, their respective defence ministers meet annually 
to share their positions on international affairs. In 2014, China and Russia’s defence ministers 
designated the United States as being their countries’ main threat, denouncing the American 
involvement in Central Asia, who they believe are responsible for the colour revolutions in the 
region. They also denounced Washington’s lack of  respect for territorial integrity (Korolev 2018: 
30). China and Russia are mainly concerned about the USA interfering in their internal affairs or 
disturbing their immediate geopolitical neighbourhood. 
In summary, the changes in the international environment as well as its pressure, have 
pushed Russia and China to reinforce their collaboration. Russia and China also share a similar 
vision of  the world order and both want to revise the international order. 
 
Section 2) Russian and Chinese visions of the international order 
 
Since the 19th century Russian political leaders have been divided into three groups: 
Westernisers, Statists and Civilisationists. During Dimitri Medvedev’s term as president of  Russia 
(2008 – 2012), as he belongs to the Westernizer group, he tried to improve relations with the West. 
The “reset” of  relations between the Obama administration and Russia in 2009 was an example of  
this policy. However, since Putin’s return to power, Russia has adopted a more civilisationist 
approach (Feklyunina 2018: 5). This means that instead of  pursuing integration with the West, 
Russia pursues its own special path, with its own values and identity. The Russian regime’s doctrine 
has been that it defends traditional values at home (orthodox Christianity, traditional family, etc) 
and the interests of  the Russian world abroad (March 2018: 85). Under Putin’s first mandate, the 
Russian diplomacy had a more multilateral and collaborative approach than after 2012, when her 
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approach was more assertive. To understand these changes, one must look at the importance of  
status recognition for Russia. This need of  recognition can be traced back at least to Peter the 
Great and the Tsarist period. The great power discourse was then already important for the Russian 
Empire and continued to be so during the Soviet period as well as the post-Soviet period 
(Feklyunina 2018: 10). The importance for Russia to be recognised as a great power is partly 
because it has always been considered as a subaltern empire by the West, while Russia was the 
hegemon in her own region. This particular way of  economic development has pushed Russia’s 
quest for recognition as a great power, according to Morozov’s world-systems theory (Morozov 
2015, cited in Feklyunina 2018: 11). Putin’s assertiveness towards the US and NATO can be also 
explained by this theory. Much of  Russian griefs against NATO come from the feeling that during 
the 1990s Russian interests were not respected, especially during the Kosovo war of  1999. Putin 
denounced the US hegemony in his Munich speech of  2007, feeling still that Russia was not treated 
as she should be. Thus, after his return to power in 2012 he decided that Russia would pursue her 
own path as Moscow felt Russia’s status was not recognised at its true value. As Sergei Lavrov, the 
Russian foreign affairs minister, stressed it “Russia should be perceived as an essential element of  
any new global equilibrium” (Lavrov 2016, cited in Ziegler 2018: 126). To be recognised as a great 
power is thus one of  the key goals of  the Russian foreign policy. In general, Russia’s foreign policy 
is considered by many as based on traditional realist principles, such as the search for power, sphere 
of  influence and security (March 2018: 81). Being a great power is therefore important for Russia’s 
identity as well as her security. Russia has enough state capacity to participate in the international 
security competition race, as it was demonstrated during the Crimea crisis. John Mearsheimer 
explained Russia’s actions by saying that “This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are always sensitive 
to potential threats near their home territory” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 82 cited in Berryman 2018: 71).  
The concept of  zone of  influence is indeed very important for Moscow, who demonstrated that it 
would not hesitate to use military actions to protect its influence in the Near Abroad. 
Russia’s long-term geopolitical strategy is to establish a modern version of  the Great Power 
Concert that prevailed in the 19th century Europe. Russia would like the end of  the US unipolarity, 
which would be replaced by several regional great powers who would collaborate on the most 
important international issues while maintaining security in their proximate geopolitical 
environment. These great powers, evolving in a multipolar international environment, would more 
or less be the US, Western European states, Russia, China, Brazil and India (the BRICS) (Weber 
2018: 110). This international order can be based on the cardinal Westphalian values that Russia 
promotes: non-interference in internal affairs, territorial integrity, sovereignty. Russia is hesitant 
with the concept of  global governance, as her attitude towards the Responsibility to Protect 
23 
 
principle demonstrates (Ziegler 2018: 124). In sum, Moscow wishes to protect its sphere of  
influence in the post-Soviet space and to establish a multipolar balance of  power. Russian foreign 
policy is a combination of  realpolitik and of  the promotion of  Russia as a distinct civilization.  The 
Russian diplomacy mainly promotes realist ideas. 
China is a land empire with a multinational but unitary state, and a heavily centralized 
administration. Internal sources of  vulnerability in China include minorities, notably in the Tibet 
and Xinjiang regions. More than 90% of  the population belongs to the Han ethnicity. Until the 
1970s, China had a state folded in on itself, with a planned economy and collectivisation. The 
country has developed since the 1980s and the arrival to power of  Deng Xiaoping, who 
modernised the economy into a market economy. During the 1990s China’s growth was more than 
10% per year, until she became the world’s first economy in GDP in purchasing power parity as 
mentioned above in 2014. These economic changes have fundamentally changed the Chinese 
foreign policy. Before, China was living in autarky and was centred on her internal economic 
development. China developed her foreign policy at the beginning of  the 21st century with the 
arrival to power of  Hu Jintao, who promoted the concept of  peaceful rise of  China. The principle 
of  this policy was to break with China’s previous autarky without entering into competition with 
the other great powers and to focus on the economic development. When Xi Jinping arrived in 
power in 2013, he developed a more affirmative foreign policy. Beijing’s objectives were to be 
recognised as a great power, to consolidate its influence in the Asia-Pacific region and to constitute 
a pole of  power in an international order less centric and more multipolar. As for Russia, the 
recognition of  her great power status is fundamental for China. The 19th and 20th centuries were 
perceived as humiliating centuries for China, which was then under the influence of  the Western 
powers who had established colonies in the Middle Empire. 
China’s geopolitical vision can be explained in concentric terms. In this Chinese geopolitical 
vision, China is the centre of  the world and is surrounded by different circles more or less 
important for her national security. The first circle is the area inhabited by the Han ethnicity. The 
second circle is the Chinese regions non-inhabited by the Hans, such as Xinjiang, they represent a 
buffer zone between China and the rest of  the world. The third circle are the territories outside of  
the Chinese territory but fundamental for the Chinese strategic interests, such as the South China 
Sea. The fourth circle are the sovereign nations around China, where Beijing wishes to exert some 
influence, such as Mongolia. The fifth and final circle is the rest of  the world, which China does 
not want to dominate but interact with it to booster her economic and commercial interests. The 
main area of  interests for China are the first, second and third circles. Beijing considers to have an 
historical right of  influence in this region. The fourth circle acts more like a buffer zone region 
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(Dufour 1999). In definitive, this geopolitical vision considers that China has a historical right in a 
particular region, which joins Russia’s vision of  the Near Abroad. Both countries have the same 
objectives of  promoting a more multipolar world order; of  preserving their influence and interests 
in their geopolitical environments and of  being considered as great powers. This conception of  
the international system divided in different poles dominated by one regional power reunites them 
in opposition to the US hegemony. The US considers in fact democracy and liberalism as universal 
values that should be implemented everywhere in the world. 
 
Section 3) Russia’s Pivot to Asia in 2012 
 
Following the degradation of  Russia’s relations with the West, when Putin took office for 
the third time in 2012 he proclaimed Russia’s pivot to Asia, meaning that the Russian diplomacy 
would seek to focus on the Asia-Pacific region and focus its efforts on this region. It was not really 
an abrupt decision but more the gradual process that had been ongoing for several years. It is 
noteworthy to remember that it took place at the same moment as the Obama Administration’s 
pivot to Asia (Clinton 2011). This shows the importance of  great power politics on Russia’s ties 
with Asia and especially China. The 2012 Russian pivot to Asia was also the year when the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit took place in Vladivostok. It enhanced the 
importance of  this regional organisation, and the other multilateral Asian organisations, for Russia. 
The Russian diplomacy in fact recalibrated its network diplomacy towards the Asia-Pacific region. 
The concept of  network diplomacy is to “move beyond the bloc politics of  the Cold War and 
engage any combination of  states based on coincident interests” (Ziegler 2018: 131). Sergei Lavrov 
had been promoting network diplomacy as an effective tool for Russia to achieve its foreign policy 
interests. Under the context of  Russia’s pivot to Asia, this meant that the Russian diplomacy would 
focus on the Asian organisations Moscow was a member of, the most important ones being the 
SCO, the BRICS, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). These organisations are of  
the utmost importance for the Kremlin, as they represent a non-Western approach to collaboration. 
China is also a member of  all of  them. They represent China’s and Russia’s wish to implement a 
more multipolar order and to develop international organisations that are not dominated by the 
US or the Europeans. As diplomacy is one of  the hard power tools, it needs the support of  the 
other tools that are economy and the military to be credibly implemented. The reform of  the 
Russian forces after 2008 and the military interventions in Syria (2011) and Ukraine (2014) 
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demonstrated that the Kremlin was ready to support its foreign policy objectives with the military 
if  needed and a clear commitment to the objective of  a more multipolar world. 
This new foreign policy, which designated NATO and the US as Russian’s main enemies 
and enhanced the need for collaboration with Moscow’s Asian partners, was supported by several 
Russian official documents. The first document is the Military Doctrine of  the Russian Federation 
published in 2014. It listed the expansion and enlargement of  NATO as the main external threat 
for Russia. The second one is the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in 2015. It blamed 
the war in Ukraine on the United States and its Western allies. They were also accused of  acting 
against the independence of  Russia’s foreign policy. A special attention was also given to the 
biological arms and the threat that American labs could constitute for Russia (National Security 
Strategy of  the Russian Federation 2015). The third document is the Russian foreign policy concept 
published in 2016. This document underlined the instability of  the international system due to the 
international tensions between countries, as well as the growing use of  force as a tool in foreign 
policy (Foreign Policy Concept of  2016). These documents draw the general vision of  Russia that 
the current international order is dominated by the US hegemony and that a more multipolar world 
would be preferable. Putin has several times stated that the US and their Western allies refused to 
recognise Russia’s status as a regional power in Eurasia, as well as its right to a have its zone of  
influence in the Near Abroad. Following the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin has looked in the East 
for a new and alternative international order that is not based on Western standards (Roberts 2018: 
248). 
 
Section 4) The Shanghai Spirit, an alternative approach to multilateralism 
 
China and Russia generally agree on most of  the international issues, especially about non-
interference, the importance of  sovereignty, territorial integrity, their opposition to regime change 
and colour revolutions. Their strategic partnership is defined by their shared Westphalian principles, 
a coordination on some international issues, a network of  bilateral mechanisms and same strategic 
interests. Beijing and Moscow had the opportunity to experiment their vision of  multilateralism in 
the SCO. This organisation is dedicated to a collective management of  the security in Central Asia 
by the regional states, with Russia and China as the de facto main political leaders of  the 
organisation. Through the SCO, Moscow has been able to implement its own ideal of  governance: 
rather than global governance, the Kremlin prefers a great power concert based on practical shared 
interests and not on specific values. China also promotes the same vision of  pragmatic 
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collaboration. Therefore, the SCO can be seen as a new vision of  Eurasian continentalism that 
China and Russia wish to instore, with a multilateralism based on their own terms (Lukin 2018: 
391). This non-western form of  multilateralism, also known as the Shanghai Spirit, is a fundamental 
characteristic of  the SCO and of  Russia’s and China’s vision of  the international order in general. 
The Shanghai Spirit can be defined as “centred around the idea of  multilateralism sustained on the 
principles of  sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual non-interference” (Freire 2018: 400). 
Hence, Moscow and Beijing have tried to develop an alternative model to the Western model of  
governance, one that better fits their strategic interests and their own vision of  how the 
international system should work. Hence, the pressure and the changes of  the international order 
have pushed Russia and China to increase their bilateral cooperation, as they felt a growing threat 
from the same external actor (the US) and shared the same vision of  the international order. If  
only the systemic variable was taken into account (the pressure and changes of  the anarchic 
international environment), one would expect Russia and China to have developed their strategic 
partnership into a military alliance. However, as we analysed before, their military relations remain 
ambivalent and have not developed into a military alliance. The unit level factors have influenced 
























Chapter III. Why not yet an alliance: Domestic and regional factors, 
preventing a close military alliance 
 
The next step of  this analysis is to look at the unit-level intervening variables to see how 
their interplay with the independent variable (the systemic factor). They counteract with it and 
influence the dependant variable (the foreign policy behaviour). In this case some domestic 
characteristics of  Russia as well as the geopolitical neighbouring environment influenced the 
attitude of  Russia and China as well as their military relations. The intervening variables are 
disagreements between Russian elites, persistent security concerns from the Russian government 
and the Russian fear of  Chinese hegemony in Central Asia. 
 
Section 1: Disagreements between Russian elites 
 
The Russian elite surrounding Putin at the Kremlin has been relatively divided about which 
attitude Russia should adopt towards China. To understand how these disagreements have 
influenced the Russian foreign policy, it is important to first analyze how foreign policy is made in 
today’s Russia. Across the post-Soviet space, patronal politics are spread in different political 
regimes. Hale describes them as “patronage networks defined by illiberalism and punctuated by 
color revolutions” (Hale 2014, cited in Weber 2018: 104). Patronage politics shaped Russia’s 
modern politics today too. They are inherited from the Boris Yeltsin era (1991-1999). In this 
system, the president maintains around him a circle of economic, political, security (or other 
resource) leaders that pledge him loyalty in exchange for privileged wealth or power positions. The 
system is generally stable because the political leader will use the state’s resources to prevent a 
competition for the political power. Revolutions happen when the future is not clear or when some 
members of the power coalition feel that they may lose their privileged position. When Vladimir 
Putin became president of Russia in 2000, he inherited of a particular situation. In the last Yeltsin 
years, the president had a relatively weak position while the power coalition around him was quite 
strong. His objective during his first two mandates (2000-2004 and 2004-2008) was too create a 
vertikal vlasti, a vertical of power in Russian, which would concentrate power in a top-down system 
centered in the Kremlin and neutralize opposition to his leadership (Weber 2018: 110). He managed 
to build a small coalition of devotees around him, to re-centralize the Russian state and eliminate 
any serious political concurrence. The center of foreign policy decisions is now located in the 
Kremlin, around the president and his counsellors, in a centralized process that can evoke the role 
28 
 
of the Politburo in the formation of the Soviet foreign policy (Ziegler 2018: 128). It is important 
to note that in the super-presidential Russian system inherited from the 1990s, the president enjoys 
a lot of freedom in the foreign policy decision-making. Strong leaders are also generally popular in 
Russia, thus the president’s role must not be underestimated (Roberts 2018). 
 
Nevertheless, Putin needs his coalition to stay faithful to him to maintain in power, so he 
has to take into account their interests. The political and economic resources in Russia are 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, either oligarchs or long-term politicians. The 
coalition around Putin has changed over the years, either in numbers or in composition, with 
groups from different backgrounds. The composition of Putin’s coalition influences Russia’s 
foreign policy in function of the interests of its actors. Thus, Russia’s policy towards China has 
been influenced by the power coalition around Putin. 
 
During Putin’s first and second term, the siloviki gained in power in Putin’s coalition, 
outreaching other actors. Siloviki designs the officials that come from the security services, the law-
enforcement and the military. Putin has a background in the security services, as he is a former 
Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) officer as well as the former director of the FSB 
(Federal Security Service). This has influenced his worldview as well as his entourage. A lot of his 
most trusted advisors come from security services agencies or the military. Here is a non-exhaustive 
list of the main security and military agencies in Russia. The FSB is the agency generally interested 
in foreign political and economic issues. The agency which deals with military intelligence is the 
GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) which is part of the Ministry of Defence. The role of  the 
siloviki in Russia’s foreign policy, and particularly of the chekisty (officials with a background in the 
security services), is linked to the proximity that their leaders have with Putin and to the role they 
occupy within the political system, as patronage politics theory suggests (Strokan and Taylor, 2018). 
The Ministry of Defence is another agency that has a relative influence in foreign policy. During 
the Soviet era, the Ministry of Defence generally had more influence and power than today. 
Nevertheless, it still maintains influence in the issues of disarmament and national security, notably 
because they are areas where a lot of technical expertise is needed (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2018: 
174). Military is just one of the tools of Russia’s foreign policy, thus the influence of the Ministry 
of Defence is not very broad. So from 2000 to 2008, siloviki officials were the most important group 
in Putin’s power coalition. When he decided to focus on improving relations with the West and 
the fight against terrorism after September 2001, the members of his coalition did not protest 
much. In fact, the chekisty officials did not trust Beijing, and they have been among the most 
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suspicious about China’s intentions since that time, especially the FSB. The arms manufacturers 
were also satisfied as arms sales towards China were good. The military had a ambivalent relation 
towards China, as they saw the possibility of cooperating with China against the US but also feared 
the quick build up of the Chinese army (Kaczmarski 2014: 399). The geopolitical environment 
however changed, pushing Russia away from the West and closer to the East. Following its ‘pivot 
to the East” in 2012, the Kremlin initially sought to pursue a multi-vector policy in Asia, and to 
collaborate not only with China but also with India, Vietnam or South Korea. Putin’s power 
collation also went under some changes at the beginning of the 2010s. If the siloviki officials 
remained powerful, they were fighting over resources and other groups emerged, in particular 
coalition members with economic resources. It was in their interest to collaborate closely with 
China, given the country’s spectacular economic growth. The growing importance of the members 
with economic and energy resources in Putin’s coalition had also an influence on the fact that 
Russia’s Asian policy started to focus principally on China, to the expense of her other Asian 
partners. Indeed, they had more to gain by collaborating closer with China, especially within the 
energy sector (Kaczmarski 2014: 401). 
 
Nevertheless, the siloviki officials remained important members of Putin’s power coalition 
and still had some influence in the foreign policy realm. The chekisty officials, especially the FSB, 
and the Minister of Defence, have been since the 2000s the more concerned about the sale of 
advanced technological weaponry to China. They were worried that Beijing would engage in 
reverse-engineering if Russia sold to China its most advanced weapons, and suspect China to have 
already done that  in the past. The FSB particularly objected to the sale of the S-400 missile-defence 
system to the Chinese army, as it is one of Russia’s most advanced weapons systems (Røseth 2018: 
8). The sale of the SU-35 fighter jets is another example of the mistrust that the Russian defence 
sector officials have towards Beijing. This transaction necessitated many years of negotiations 
before it was concluded. Beijing was wary that Moscow was overpricing the planes, while the 
Russians thought that China was going to copy the model due to the fact that the initial Chinese 
offer was for four planes (Schwartz 2017). The arms manufacturers, another component of the 
siloviki group, are also reluctant to sell such technology to the Chinese. The J-11B Chinese fighter 
jet has been accused by many of being a copy of the Russian SU-27 (Bolt 2014: 57). On the fighter 
jets market, the Russian MiG-29 is in competition with the Chinese JF-17, which uses the RD-39 
engines from Rosoboronexport as one of its components. Rosoboronexport received a letter from 
the United Aircraft Corporation to limit its sales of RD-93 to Chinese companies due to the 
competition between the JF-17 and Su-27 fighter jets (Page 2010). Yevgeny Livadny, the director 
30 
 
of intellectual property projects at Rostec company, has accused in March 2020 China of copying 
Russian technology: “There have been 500 such cases over the past 17 years. China alone has 
copied aircraft engines, Sukhoi planes, deck jets, air defence systems, portable air defence missiles, 
and analogues of the Pantsir medium-range surface-to-air systems” (Livadny 2020, cited in 
Cordesman 2020: 21).   
This is another demonstration that many officials among the siloviki are reluctant to 
collaborate to closely with China in the sphere of defence. It depends on which organisation the 
officials belong too, as some will see more advantages in collaborating with Beijing while others 
will see that as a threat to Russia’s national security. As the siloviki officials retain important power 
positions within Putin’s winning coalition, the opposition of a group of them to a too close military 
relation with China can be seen as one of the factors that has prevented the formation of a full 
military alliance. 
 
Section 2: Persistent security concerns from the Russian government 
 
The next intervening variable that this analysis will look at is the persistent security concerns 
from the Russian government, and how they had an effect on the Sino-Russian military relations. 
 
a) The Chinese military 
As mentioned before, the official discourse from the Kremlin is that China is not a threat 
for Russia’s national security. Despite these statements, the Russian army still sent more military 
forces to its bases in the Far Eastern district, along the 4 200 kilometres border that Russia shares 
with China. At the same time, the Pacific Fleet has been reinforced. In the last decade, the People’s 
Liberation Army has indeed undergone under big transformations. The Chinese military has 
modernised and acquired new technology; partly thanks to Russian arms sales, and the number of  
troops has increased. Hence the military power of  China has surpassed Russia’s one, in a historical 
change in their bilateral relations has during the 20th century the Red Army used to be much 
superior to the Chinese army. Russia cannot ignore this change in power positions. The troop 
reinforcements mentioned before show that even if  Moscow will not speak about any threat, some 
preventive measures have been taken to ensure Russia’s security (Bolt 2014: 56). The Russian 
conventional forces are now inferior to the US ones as well as to the Chinse ones. For example, in 
2015 Russia had 2 700 main battles tanks, while the US had 2 384 and China 6 540. Russia is also 
spending much less money for its military expenditure than China and the US, which contributes 
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to increase the military gap. The Chinese conventional forces are now superior to the Russian ones, 
which creates a national security concern for the Kremlin. 
Figure 3: Russian, U.S. and Chinese military capabilities, 2015  
Item  Russia  U.S.  China  
Military expenditure, U.S. 
$bn  
65.6  597.5  145.8  
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AIFVd – armoured infantry fighting vehicle 
APCe – armoured personnel carrier 
ARTYf – artillery 
ICBMg – intercontinental ballistic missile 




b) The nuclear question 
The main forces Russia relies on to dissuade other great powers from attacking her are her 
strategic forces, which regroup her nuclear weapons. On this aspect, Russia has a much larger 
arsenal than China. Thus, the Russian army counts on its nuclear weapons to guarantee the 
country’s national security against the US but also against China (Konyshev and Sergunin, 2018: 
176). This nuclear question is also a part of  the Russian army concerns towards China. In fact, 
China’s traditional posture towards nuclear arms is to maintain a small nuclear arsenal but without 
revealing the exact number, which is kept secret. From Beijing’s point of  view, the US and Russia 
must agree to diminish their nuclear arsenal first, then only China will accept to engage discussions 
about arms control. While Russia and the US have indeed lowered the number of  their deployed 
strategic forces, China has been suspected of  augmenting her own nuclear forces (Bolt 2014: 64). 
The nuclear question is particularly strategic in the Asia-Pacific region. In this zone, China, 
the US and Russia form what has been called by experts the Great Strategic Triangle. The Asia-
Pacific region is fundamental for international security nowadays. The centre of  international 
relations has moved from the Atlantic in the 20th century to the Pacific in the 21st century. In 
international security though, the traditional strategic equilibrium of  the Cold War continues to 
play a fundamental role. The USSR and the US signed their first disarmament treaties in the 1970s. 
Russia inherited the international juridical personality of  the USSR and continued to apply those 
treaties, as well as negotiating new ones with the US. The actual treaty regulating the nuclear 
relations between the US and Russia is the new START treaty, which ends in 2021. The key 
principles that regulate the nuclear questions between Russia and the US are the following: nuclear 
parity and nuclear deterrence (United States Department of  State, 2020). Nuclear parity means that 
they maintain relatively the same number of  active nuclear weapons and that they are limited on 
the maximum number that they can possess. Nuclear deterrence means that if  a state A launches 
a nuclear attack on the state B, the latter possesses enough nuclear weapons to retaliate, which 
would destroy the state A too and assure the mutual destruction of  both states. It is the so-called 
equilibrium of  terror. 
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However, China does not take part in this equilibrium. In fact, China is the only state among 
the five nuclear states officially recognized by the UN to not reveal which exact number of  nuclear 
weapons she possesses. Beijing has repeatedly refused to engage in arms control negotiations 
before that both the US and Russia agree to diminish their number of  nuclear warheads. China’s 
official position has been that it maintains only a small number of  strategic weapons active for her 
national security, but doubts about the veracity of  this doctrine have emerged in the recent years. 
Several experts have on the contrary suggested that China is reinforcing her nuclear arsenal. Of  
course, the overall number of  nuclear weapons that Russia, the US and China possess is in a huge 
favor of  both Russia and the US, and Russia is not threatened per se by a nuclear asymmetry 
(Arbatov and Dvorkin, 2013). 
 
Figure 4: Comparative figure of the US, Russia and China nuclear arsenals  
 
The noticeable detail on this figure is the 800 nuclear weapons that China is suspected to 
possess in tunnels. The Chinese army has, according to several policy experts, built was is informally 
called as the Underground Great Wall of  China. It is a vast network of  tunnels designed to store 
and hide military materials, mainly strategic missiles and nuclear weapons (Wan 2011). The 
importance of  this question is fundamental in regards to China’s capability to retaliate after a 
nuclear attack by another state. 
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The US refuses to recognize to China the existence of  a mutual nuclear deterrence, and 
Russia has adopted the same position. Russia and China have left the question of  the mutual nuclear 
deterrence out of  their relations. The nuclear doctrine of  China is that she will never use nuclear 
weapons first, but only if  she is attacked to retaliate. On the contrary, Russia, as the US, has very 
specific cases where she plans to use her nuclear weapons first, such has if  another state attacks 
her and the existence of  Russia is threatened. Moscow has instated the last years on the crucial 
importance of  its nuclear arsenal to ensure Russia’s national security. China demands that the US 
and Russia officially abandon any usage of  first use of  nuclear weapons before entering any arms 
control negotiations (Arbatov and Dvorkin, 2013). 
However, this is a sensitive issue for Russia because of  her reliance on nuclear dissuasion. 
As seen before, the Chinese army has now surpassed the Russian one both in size and equipment, 
except for the nuclear forces. In addition, China has reinforced her forces in its Northern territories 
near the Russian border (Røseth 2018: 12). Her nuclear arsenal has thus become increasingly 
important for Russia’s security towards China, especially in Siberia and the Russian Far East. Giving 
up the first use of  nuclear weapons would mean for Moscow abandoning its only military 
superiority over China. Russia has also been sceptical about the Chinese nuclear military doctrine. 
Usually when a nuclear state adheres to the no first use of  nuclear principle, it means that this state 
will employ nuclear force only for retaliation after an enemy attack. But if  China only has the 800 
nuclear weapons that experts generally presumed, it would mean that she does not have the capacity 
to retaliate as their nuclear arsenal would be mostly destroyed after a first attack. So, to have a 
retaliation capacity she would need to have another nuclear weapons stock available, as some 
researchers have suggested she has in the underground tunnels. The secrecy about this question 
and about the real number of  the Chinese nuclear arsenal is deeply disturbing for Russia’s national 
security and may cause additional frictions as measure as the military gap increases between the 
two countries. Additionally, the Russian proposal to construct with the US a joint Ballistic Missile 
Defence system has provoked some swirls in Beijing. Chinese officials have felt this proposal as a 
bias against China, in that they were excluded from the proposal (Arbatov and Dvorkin, 2013). 
As the overall situation suggests, the nuclear question is a domain where Russia and China 
do not have the same views and it can be considered as a factor preventing a full military alliance. 
 
c) The Russian Far East 
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Russia has historically been worried about Chinese intentions concerning the Russian Far 
East. Since the 19th century, the Tsars were concerned about massive Chinese immigration in the 
Far East. It is a particular area of  vulnerability for Russia, due to the exode of  the population and 
the weak economic activity. During the Soviet times, the region was given a high priority: people 
were encouraged to go and live there by receiving high salaries in compensation, investments were 
made to develop the region and factories were built. After the fall of  the Soviet Union, the region 
suffered from a lack of  investment which conduced many of  its previous inhabitants to leave the 
region and to migrate to Western Russian in hope of  better living conditions. The 1990s were times 
when Moscow was particularly concerned about the Far East as the border was still undermarked 
(Kurht 2018: 255). Even if  this question has been resolved, Moscow still has concerns about this 
region due to its wealth in natural resources, which China is very much in need of. The continuing 
depopulation and the recent immigration of  Chinese workers remains a source of  concern too. 
The regional authorities of  the Far Eastern districts have been willing to attract Chinese 
investments to develop the region’s autonomy, as investments from Moscow were not sufficient. 
They want to give the priority to the economic development of  the region, which is especially rich 
in hydrocarbons (Røseth 2018: 7). 
 The federal government seems to have a dual policy towards the Far East. In 2012 a new 
Ministry for Far Eastern development was created in Moscow, which looked like the government 
was giving priority to the development of  the region. However, the facts have contradicted this 
affirmation, as the Fast East has not received substantial funds from Moscow. Russia is divided 
between the need of  investments in the region and the security concerns that it upholds towards 
Beijing’s intentions. Russia has turned towards its other traditional Asian partners to diversify the 
investments in the region and avoid the predominance of  one country in the Far East. Russia has 
tried to develop economic links with Vietnam, its long-term ally in Southeast China. The trade 
between Vietnam and Russia has developed rapidly since the 2010s (Korolev and Portyakov, 2018: 
428). Yet, Chinese investments still represent the big majority of  all the foreign investments in the 
Russian Far East. 
Russian officials have repeatedly stated that the region is crucial for Moscow. The land mass 
of  the Far East is enormous, as it represents around 36% of  the whole Russian territory. It is the 
key to Russia’s access to the Asia-Pacific region, where the Pacific Fleet is stationed, a huge reservoir 
of  resources (gas, oil, minerals, wood). But at the same time, it suffers from underdevelopment and 
mass emigration. The Far East only represented in 2015 5,5% of  Russia’s global GDP (Stronski 
and Ng, 2018: 18). Moreover, the Siberian territories were ceded to Russia by China in a series of  
19th century treaties that Beijing has several times called as unequal, weakening in Moscow old fears 
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of  Chinese irredentism. Russian economic goals in the region are to move from raw materials 
exportations to manufacture and industrial production. China has committed to several projects to 
develop the industrial sector of  the Far East, but doubts have emerged in regard to the actual 
realisation of  these projects. If  on the official level authorities emphasize these new economic 
projects, their actual implementation meets more difficulties. Chinese and Russian business cultures 
are different, and Chinese businessmen have faced troubles with slow bureaucracy and reluctance 
from some local authorities. Some mistrust is still present among the local population, as the 2015 
demonstrations around the Baikal region demonstrated. The local population was protesting 
against the lease of  some farmlands to a Chinese company. These demonstrations showed that the 
local people are still wary about a Chinese economic domination of  the region (Stronski and NG, 
2018: 21). Russians are also afraid that the big Chinese companies will represent an unequitable 
threat for local Russians companies, as they do not possess the same means and capital. 
The Far East is also a strategic region for Russia’s national security as it the area where huge 
gas and oil fields are located. Most of  the gas fields exploited today in Russia are in Western Siberia, 
while the reserves and future fields are located in Eastern Siberia. Oil and gas production 
represented in 2018 38.9% of  Russia’s revenues (Warsaw Institute, 2020). Thus, they are a strategic 
resource for the Russian government and their exploitation must be secured. This concern is 
apparent in the Russian official documents, which have listed as potential threats the 
overdependence of  Russia on hydrocarbons resources and the risk of  losing the control over these 
hydrocarbons (Grajauskas, 2009). In this regard, Russia has been concerned with her unbalanced 
relations with China over the energy sector. After the Ukrainian crisis of  2014 and the downfall of  
European-Russia relations, the European Union has reaffirmed her will to diversify her supply of  
energy to ensure her national security. Russia, for her own national security, has looked to the East 
to diversify her export energy routes, turning particularly to China’s enormous energy needs. In 
this context and after several years of  negotiations the Power of  Siberia gas deal was signed 
between Russia and China in May 2014. The experts noted that the deal’s conditions were 
economically favourable to China, as Russia’s economy had suffered from the Western sanctions 
and needed this deal to signed (Kurht 2018: 259). China managed to fix gas prices favourable to 
her, and Beijing is now buying from Gazprom gas at a lower price (per cubic meter of  gas) than 
the Western European states. China is mainly interested in the Russian Far East as a way to secure 
her tremendous needs of  energy resources. Beijing’s southern energy imports are mainly through 
sea routes, which could be easily disrupted in case of  a US blockade (Stronski and Ng, 2018: 21). 
Therefore, Russia has also security concerns about its energy relations with China, which are quite 
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asymmetrical as Russia needs more to sell energy to China than China needs to buy energy from 
Russia.   
Neither China or Russia have to gain into engaging in economic or political disputes around 
the Russian Far East. As the officials have repeatedly stated, both countries have an interest in 
developing the region’s economy. The difficulty relies on the implementation of  the actual projects 
which are often only committed through joint statements or communiqués. As in other aspects of  
the Sino-Russian partnership, there is sometimes a gap between the political will and the actual 
realisation of  the projects. Generally, the Russian Far East is a region that will require further 
observation to see the consistency and success of  Moscow’s Asian policy. Natasha Kurht has 
resumed the situation in these words: “a failure to integrate the region with broader integrative 
processes would consign the Russian Far East to the status of  a ‘double periphery, a region on the 
periphery not only of  the Asia-Pacific, but also of  European Russia” (Kurht 2018: 260). 
 
d) Territorial claims 
Russia and China hold frequent bilateral meetings to agree on their foreign policy views 
and often express common positions about international issues. However, at times they have lacked 
support for one another. Their different regional security policies have led them to not support 
each other’s territorial claims, which resulted in some frustration from both sides. 
Russia had some reluctance to support China’s territorial revendications in the South China 
Sea dispute. This territorial dispute opposes China to several other states in the region. China claims 
to have historical rights within a nine-dash line from its earth border, which represents around 80% 
of  the South China Sea. Almost three quarters of  China’s energy imports pass through this area. 
This question is of  crucial importance for China, both for her national security and in identity 
terms, as this sea is within China’s geopolitical third circle, which is considered as a part of  China’s 
rightful zone of  influence. 
Russia has not supported China as Moscow does not want its Asia-Pacific policy to be 
subordinated to China’s one, especially that this territorial dispute involves strategic partners of  
Russia such as Vietnam. Vietnam has been a military and economic partner of  Russia since the 
Soviet era, and supporting China would be a risk of  falling apart with Hanoi for Moscow, at a time 




Figure 5: The South China Sea dispute 
 
Source: ‘China versus Vietnam: An Analysis of the Competing Claims in the South China Sea’ 
Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, CNA Occasional Paper, 2014 
https://seasresearch.wordpress.com/2014/08/19/china-versus-vietnam-an-analysis-of-the-
competing-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-2/ 
Russia expressed concern about the freedom of  navigation regarding the South China Sea 
dispute, which led some Chinese analysts to criticize what they saw as a lack of  support from the 
Kremlin. Moscow’s official position has been to remain neutral, to call for a pacific and multilateral 
resolution of  the question, to keep the issue at a regional level and to avoid the implication of  
extra-territorial actors. Russia stated that the parties should solve the issue in light of  the 
international law, most notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea. Russia has 
remained cautious on not expressing any positions regarding the territorial claims of  any of  the 
parties. The Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs  officially commented in 2016 that Russia “would 
never be involved in it [the dispute]; we consider it a matter of  principle not to side with any party” 
(Russian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 2016, cited in Korolev and Portyakov, 2018: 423). 
Nevertheless, in 2016 several actions led by Russia shown an increased support for China’s side in 
the dispute. Russia agreed to conduct the Joint Sea military exercise in 2016 in the South China Sea, 
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which raised concerns among other states in the region. The Permanent Court of  Arbitration of  
the Hague ruled in 2016 in favour of  the Philippines against the Chinese territorial claims. China 
did not recognise this decision and Putin officially supported Beijing’s position at the Hanzhou 
Summit of  September 2016. The Russian position was though more about criticising the 
involvement of  the court on territorial disputes between sovereign states than a support for 
Chinese territorial claims (Kurht 2018: 262). 
Similarly, China has not backed up the Russian territorial claims in Crimea or recognised 
the republics of  Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Beijing has not joined the Western nations in 
condemning the Russians actions in Georgia and Ukraine, but remained neutral about the 
Ukrainian crisis and the Caucasus republics. In 2008 following the Georgian War, China remained 
outside of  the issue at the United Nations, and explained that she did not want to get involved in 
this regional affair. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Beijing’s position was quite similar. China 
was attentive to remain neutral and to underline that she was in support of  a peaceful political 
resolution that would satisfy all the parties involved. China abstained herself  in all the votes 
concerning the Ukrainian crisis at the UN Security Council. The Ukrainian crisis did not change 
the Russian-Chinese relations, and business continued as usual. The bilateral relation even 
intensified as the West took sanctions against Russia, provoking a fall in Russia’s economic relations 
with Europe and pushing further Moscow’s pivot to the East. In spite of  this, China’s official 
position at the UN was a full support for the principles of  territorial integrity and state sovereignty. 
Liu Jievi, the Chinese envoy to the UN, expressed that Beijing “does not approve confrontational 
methods” (Liu Jievi 2014, cited in Korolev and Portyakov 2018: 420). Some signs showed that 
China chose to support the new elected authorities in Kiev rather than the separatists, like the fact 
that Xi Jinping sent a special emissary to attend the assumption of  office of  Petro Porochenko. 
These different territorial claims generate some tensions between Russia and China and 
showed the limits of  their collaboration in international security. The Chinese authorities felt 
concerned about Russia’s recognition of  the independence of  South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The 
territorial integrity principle is a strategic notion for Beijing, as within China separatism is a national 
security issue for the authorities. China is worried that the success of  any new independence 
movements will encourage the separatist movements in Xinjiang, Taiwan and Tibet to pursue their 
fight. As for Russia, she does not want to be embarked in the political fight between China and her 
other Asian partners. The South China Sea dispute needs to be followed closely to observe the 
evolution of  the Sino-Russian military partnership. The growing asymmetry between Russia and 
China may push China to expect more support from Russia on her territorial claims, especially if  
Russia’s relations with the West remain at their actual level (Kurht 2018: 265). 
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f) China’s internal situation 
Finally, the Chinese internal situation is also a concern for the Russian government. If  the 
Chinese communist regime is still firmly in place in China, several events in China have raised critics 
within the international community and especially among Western powers. Russia pursues since 
Putin’s third mandate a civilisationist policy, but Western European states are still of  strategic 
importance for Moscow, which is under economic sanctions after the Ukrainian crisis. These 
sanctions have deeply hurt the Russian economy, and the Kremlin would like them to be lifted as 
soon as possible. Moreover, Europe is important in identity terms for Russia, which defines herself  
more like a European state rather than an Asian one. Russia is still hoping for an improvement in 
its relations with the West, and the situation in China could impact the Russo-European relations 
as China might push for more Russian support on these issues, in a similar situation to that of  the 
South China Sea. 
The primary situation that has provoked reactions within the international community is 
the security situation in Hong Kong. Since the Umbrella Revolution of  2014 in the former British 
colony, the Chinese authorities have responded with a strict security crackdown in Hong Kong. 
The protests were led by civilians and students demanding a respect of  the territory’s autonomy 
and rule of  law. China passed in 2020 a new law on national security, which led to the arrest of  
several major figures of  the opposition, as well as an increased control over the media, the political 
system and the internet of  the peninsula. This provoked a reaction of  the Trump Administration 
who revoked the special economic status of  Hong-Kong, and took several sanctions among the 
Chinese authorities of  the region. The crisis in Hong-Kong has provoked a fall in the US-China 
relations, which impacted the whole security situation of  the Asia-Pacific region and augmented 
the instability in the area. Other partners of  Russia in the region, such as Malaysia, have also 
criticized the actions of  the Hong Kong president Carrie Lam (Kin-Wa, 2019). Russia does not 
want to take sides in this dispute, defending the traditional non-interference in internal affairs 
principle that she has for long promoted. But as the situation in Hong Kong worsens, this might 
provoke tensions with other South-East Asian states, which are concerned about the Chinese 
economic and political assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific. Russia’s pivot to Asia is accompanied by a 
will to conduct a multi -vector policy in the region to not be overdependent on China in economic 
terms, thus Russia wants to continue to appear as a neutral state in the region, a position that she 




The other main internal issue in China is the situation in Xinjiang. This North-West region 
of  China is populated mainly by the Uighur population, which has been under repression from the 
authorities in Beijing for several decades. Xinjiang became an international issue in 2017 after it 
was revealed that more than one million Uighur people were detained in forced labour camps, and 
that the Chinese authorities were conducting a Sinicization policy in the region. The UN, as well as 
Turkey, the US and some other states, have publicly condemned the Chinese policy towards the 
Uighurs. Russia has supported the Chinese policy in the region, saluting the Chinese efforts against 
terrorism (Miles 2019). Despite this, some fears have emerged in Russia that the situation will 
spread to Central Asia. Some protests have occurred in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as 
the local population is well informed about the Uighur repression due to the links existing between 
Central Asia and the Xinjiang region. The anti-Chinese resentment is growing among the Central 
Asian states, which is not a good sign for Russia (Goble 2019). If  the crackdown against Uighurs 
continues in China, which is most likely, the demonstrations and anti-Chinese feelings may grow 
among the Central Asian population and create instability in the region. Instability in this vital 
region is an important security concern for Russia, both for internal and external reasons. The 
internal reasons are that instability and radicalism in Central Asia have often nourished the same 
movements in the volatile regions of  North Caucasus and Chechnya, where Moscow had to fight 
terrorism and separatist movements. The external reason is that a growth of  radicalism in Central 
Asia may lead also to a growth of  the anti-Russian feeling in the region, given the proximity between 
Moscow and Beijing. As Russia struggles to maintain her influence in Central Asia, this is something 
Moscow does not want to happen. 
The overall situation demonstrates that there are a lot of  disparities between Russia and 
China. This is especially true in the economic realm; it creates a situation of  inequality where there 
is a risk for Russia to rely too much on China. Chinese investments are needed in Russia, especially 
in the Far East, and their common stand on international issues gives them more power, especially 
as they are both members of  the UN Security Council. At the same time, the Kremlin is conscious 
of  the dangers of  a too close relation with Beijing due to their asymmetrical relation. The Sino-
Russian strategic partnership was formed because the circumstances pushed the two countries 
together. Their ties have grown closer as their interests coincided more and more, but they are not 
formal allies. In this sense, their partnership is not a full alliance but more an informal alignment 
which may imply security concerns about the other partner (Røseth 2018: 3). The international 
events pushed Russia and China closer especially after 2014, a period where trade with China as 
well as Chinese investments were of  a huge help for Russia’s economy. However, Russia did not 
have many other options than China to turn to. And Moscow is also concerned about this 
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overdependence as Russia wants to conserve her own independent foreign policy. As a Russian 
scholar puts it: “With this paradigm still in existence, Russia will never be able to take decisions 
interfering with the Chinese interests” (Bordachev 2017, cited in Kurht 2018: 258). 
Henceforward, the growth of  the People’s Liberation Army and the subsequent change in 
military power position that it has produced; the nuclear relations; the Far East region; the energy 
relations and the economic relations have produced security concerns in Russia regarding Moscow’s 
relation with Beijing, especially because of  the growing gap between the two countries. The fact 
that Russia does not want to be considered as a subordinate partner of  China and wants to ensure 
her national security has influenced the deepness of  Moscow’s strategic partnership with Beijing. 
The persistent security concerns from the Russian government have indeed influenced the level of  
the Sino-Russian relations and prevented the formation of  a full military alliance. 
 
Section 3:  Security issues in Central Asia 
 
The last and third unit-level factor that this study will analyse is the security issues in Central 
Asia between Russia and China (the intervening variable) and how they influence the level of  their 
military relations (the dependent variable). 
The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) were progressively incorporated in the Russian Empire through the 19th century. The 
growth of  the Russian Empire worried the British Empire who engaged in a geopolitical 
competition with Russia to maintain its status as first world power. According geopolitical theories, 
in the international system “any significant changes in the balance of  power would unavoidably 
trigger ‘zero-sum game’ struggle between rival great powers” (Berryman 2018: 60). The extension 
of  Russia changed the international balance of  power and engaged the British Empire and Russia 
in what was named the Great Game, i.e. a competition for influence and power in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. Such a Great Game occurred in Central Asia because it is a strategic region in 
Eurasia, both due to its location and its resources. One of  the founders of  modern geopolitics, 
Halford Mackinder, theorized the strategic importance of  Eurasia in the race for world hegemony. 
By focusing on geography, Mackinder developed a thesis concerning the geographical pivot of  
history that is the Heartland, which can be defined as the centre of  the world. This Heartland area 
is covered by Eurasia consisting of  a vast set of  plains and plateaus stretching from the Baltic Sea 
to Eastern Siberia which is out of  reach of  ships and where, in economic and military terms, the 
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conditions for power are found. It is a space from which all the great invasions started. At the heart 
of  this Heartland lies Russia, which is the pivot whose positions will be strengthened by the 
development of  railways. It is around this Heartland that all the geopolitical dynamics of  the planet 
will revolve, according to Mackinder. Surrounding the Heartland are several rings, the first of  which 
is the Inner Crescent which is on the outskirts of  the Heartland; this inner crescent represents the 
Heartland protective belt. According to Mackinder, the Heartland and its immediate periphery, 
where is located Central Asia, is a strategic zone as the country who will control it will have the 
ability to control Greater Eurasia and the world (Mackinder 1904). 
Figure 6: The Heartland and the world, Mackinder’s vision 
 
Source: Mackinder H. J. (1904) ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, Geographical Journal, 
Volume 23, Number 4, pp. 421-437. 
Nicolas Spykman updated Mackinder’s theory. The Rimland is the key strategic concept 
that Spykman proposes to replace that of  the Heartland. It is a pivotal space on the outskirts of  
the Heartland, a region that could be defined as an intermediate region between the Heartland and 
the maritime space. Following on from its precursor, it is the Rimland which, according to 
Spykman, constitutes the fundamental friction zone in international relations. In his famous quote, 
he affirmed that “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies 
of  the world” (Spykman, 1942). Central Asia located in between the Heartland and the Rimland, is 
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thus a strategic zone for the control of  Eurasia and the world. Russia considers it as a part of  its 
legitimate zone of  influence, the Near Abroad, and has since the 19th century been the security 
guarantor in the region. 
However, since the beginning of  the 21st century China has become a key actor in the 
region, particularly in economic terms. China needed to increase her imports of  energy, and the 
Central Asian states sought to diversify their hydrocarbons exportations as they were too dependent 
of  Russia. China constructed a gas pipeline system in Central Asia to import energy from 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and became in 2008 the first trading partner of  the 
Central Asian countries (Omelicheva 2018: 331). The arrival of  China in the region was met with 
uncertainty, as her economic relations with the Central Asian countries could have provoked a 
backlash in Beijing’s relations with Moscow. Russia and China have not yet been in open 
confrontation regarding Central Asia. They have worked to cooperate through multilateral 
institutions to fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism as well as the US presence in the 
region and colour revolutions. China is interested in the security issues of  Central Asia partly due 
to the networks that exist between Central Asia and the Xinjiang region. Russia and China created 
the SCO to cooperate on security issues in the area, conducting bilateral military exercises under 
the auspices of  the organisation. Initially, Moscow saw the SCO as an occasion to put in practise 
its own vision for Eurasia and the international order. Russia wanted the SCO to be mainly a 
political organisation, where China and Russia would collaborate along other Asian states on the 
main issues of  the region, realising in some way Primakov’s vision of  Greater Eurasia, with Russia 
collaborating with China and India to counterbalance the US (Ziegler 2018: 131). Russia’s economy 
went under recession after the financial crisis of  2008 and she was not in a position to make big 
investments in Central Asia, thus the Kremlin preferred to focus on the diplomatic side and tried 
to put a concert of  power in place within the SCO to regulate Central Asia’s security. Moscow 
wants to avoid the domination of  any power in the region, including China’s. Russia advocated for 
the enlargement of  the SCO to India, Pakistan and Iran in order to balance China’s weight and 
influence in the organisation (Lukin 2018: 396). China’s views on the SCO were somewhat different 
as Beijing view more the organisation in economic terms than in political ones. China has been 
pushing to develop the economic aspect of  the SCO, to promote more economic integration 
between its members. Russia firstly resisted these developments, but the international context 
(financial crisis of  2008, Ukrainian crisis in 2014, fall of  oil prices) made her forced to make some 
concessions to China (Freire 2018: 405). The Development Strategy Towards 2025 of  the SCO 
defined its main objectives as enforcing security in Central Asia and to increase economic 
cooperation between its states, based on the Chinese One Belt One Road (OBOR) project 
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(Molchanov 2018: 418). Moscow had little choice but to agree to expend the economic aspect of  
the SCO as China multiplied the projects outside of  this framework, the main one being the OBOR 
project. This project was launched by Beijing to develop commercial routes (on earth and on sea) 
between China and Europe, through Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia and Russia. The project 
passes right through the strategic Heartland of  Mackinder, in Russia’s traditional zone of  influence. 
 
Figure 7: China’s One Belt One Road project.  
 
Source: AP Human Geography  
https://aphug-hansen.weebly.com/uploads/2/3/9/3/23931771/geopolitical_theories.pdf 
Russia had her own plans for the region, as Moscow would prefer to manage the region’s 
economy through its own institutions, most notably the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), of  
which Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members and Tajikistan a candidate. China’s project pushed 
Russia to collaborate with Beijing on this question out of  the fear that these new projects would 
simply bypass her. In May 2015 China and Russia signed an agreement on the cooperation between 
China’s Silk Road Initiative and the EEU, with the final objective of  creating a free economic zone. 
The observers noted that Moscow was more resolved to make concessions than being very 
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enthusiastic about the project (Kurht 2018: 264). As the Russian expert Dmitry Yefremenko 
analyses it, “the initiative was partly defensive and designed to ease the tension that would otherwise 
have developed” (Yefremenko 2017, cited in Freire 2018: 405). 
In definitive, Russia and China are competing for influence in an area that Mackinder and 
Spkyman demonstrated to be strategic for great powers. Their game for influence is also because 
they do not have the same vision for Central Asia. Moscow has since Putin’s third term developed 
an increasingly civilisational foreign policy and insists on its geopolitical view of  a multipolar world 
divided into spheres of  influence. In this understanding, Central Asia is a part of  Russia’s legitimate 
zone of  influence, which encompasses more or less the post-Soviet space. Yet, from China’s 
perspective this view does not fit her best interests in the region (Bolt 2014: 50). Chinese foreign 
policy experts have expressed reserves about Russia’s concept of  zone of  influence, claiming that 
Moscow should stop trying to implement this vision and to consider the post-soviet space as her 
rightful zone of  influence and to focus more on a good neighbouring policy (Korolyev and 
Portyakov, 2018: 425). China has seen the concept of  zone of  influence as a potential threat for 
her OBOR project and wants to promote another form of  regionalism based on pragmatic 
collaboration. An exclusive approach to regionalism as in the EEU was seen from Beijing as a way 
of  excluding China from Central Asia and bad for business (Kurht 2018: 265). As for now, China 
and Russia have managed to conceal their differences through cooperation in regional organisations 
such as the SCO and to agree to collaborate on their respective projects, the EEU and OBOR. 
Nevertheless, Russia retains concerns about China’s presence in the region, and tried to balance 
Beijing’s hegemony by conducting a multi-vector policy within the SCO. As Moscow does not 
completely trust China in Central Asia, these security issues have influenced their strategic 
partnership and their military relations. They are one of  the factors that have prevented the 
formation of  a full Sino-Russian military alliance. How they manage to collaborate between the 
SCO and the EEU will impact their strategic partnership as well as their military relations. For the 
moment China has not considered Central Asia as her top priority and is more interested in the 
region in economic terms rather than in political ones. If  this situation would be to reverse, it could 
make collaboration with Russia more difficult. As Mariya Omelicheva resumes it: “The ‘Great 









The strategic partnership between Russia and China is currently one of  the most important 
phenomena in the international system. Their relations had broken up during the Soviet Era and 
the border issue led to several military clashes that provoked a fear of  a military conflict between 
the two communist states. In spite of  this, after the end of  the Cold War the 1990s were a new 
starting point for Russia and China’s relations. The border issue was finally resolved in 2008 and 
their relations transformed into a comprehensive and strategic partnership on a level that many 
observers would not have imagined thirty years ago. The military component of  their partnership 
represents a significant part of  their relations and of  strategic importance for both countries. 
Moscow and Beijing have repeatedly issued official statements describing their relations as better 
than ever, with a strong level of  trust and cooperation. The Russian official documents underline 
the strategic importance of  this partnership. The People’s Liberation Army and the Russian Armed 
Forces have conducted many joint military exercises in the last decade, with an increased 
interoperability and a larger scale each time. Russia has sold her most advanced technology weapons 
to China, like the S-400 missile system and the SU-35 fighter jets. The senior officials of  the two 
armies have held frequent top-brass meetings, to share their views on international security and 
train together. These indicators show an increased trust between Russia and China and an 
improvement in the level of  their military relations. Nevertheless, some mistrust remains between 
the two partners. The unilateral military exercises conducted by Russia and China as well as their 
deployment of  military forces along their common border show that they still unofficially 
acknowledge each other as a potential threat. They also have collaborated in cybersecurity, as hybrid 
warfare will play an increasingly important role in the military. But in this domain their collaboration 
remains rather limited. 
Russia and China are both great powers engaged in the international competition for power. 
The international system, characterized since the 1990s by the US unipolarity, went in the last 
decade under a series of  changes. Russia recovered from the fall of  the Soviet Union, re-engaging 
herself  on the international scene with the Russo-Georgian war of  2008. China became an 
economic global power, challenging the US domination of  the world economy in 2014. Their 
emergence as great powers allowed them to engage in external balancing against Washington. The 
international system went from the American hegemony to what experts called a “balanced 
unipolarity” (Simons 2018: 48). The colour revolutions in the post-soviet space, the Russo-
Georgian war of  2008, the Ukrainian crisis of  2014 and the sanctions that followed deteriorated 
Russia’s relations with the West and increased the pressure Moscow was under. Similarly, China felt 
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an increased pressure from the US and the international system as Beijing and Washington engaged 
in a commercial war and a geopolitical competition in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Russia and China also share similar visions of  the international order. Both countries want 
to be recognised as great powers. They insist on the importance of  the traditional Westphalien 
principles of  state sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, and the 
recognition of  spheres of  influences, in opposition to the Western international vision based on 
liberalism, democracy and human rights. They developed this alternative model of  multilateralism 
within the SCO, in what became known as the Shanghai Spirit approach. Thus, the systemic analysis 
highlights that the international environment has pushed Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their 
strategic partnership and to increase the level of  their military relations. This level of  analysis is not 
enough to explain why they did not become full allies. 
The second step of  the study was to move to the unit-level of  analysis to underline which 
factors prevented the formation of  an official military alliance. The factors identified are the 
disagreements between Russian elites, the persistent security concerns from the Russian 
government and the security issues in Central Asia. These are the intervening variables that 
impacted the trend of  the independent variable on the dependent variable and countered it. Putin’s 
coalition has been divided in regard to which policy Russia should adopt towards China. Some 
members of  the siloviki, the security officials, are reluctant to adopt a policy of  complete trust 
towards Beijing. The officials with a background in the security services (the chekisty) are among 
the most suspicious about the Chinese intentions, notably the FSB, the Ministry of  Defence and 
the arms manufacturers. The members of  the governmental coalition with economic and energy 
resources are, on the contrary, more favourable to a closer relation with China. As long as the 
siloviki remain an important group in Putin’s coalition, they will be a factor preventing the formation 
of  a military alliance. 
The persistent security concerns from the Russian government are of  different natures. 
The first security concern is about the Chinese military. The People’s Liberation Army has grown 
both in troop numbers and in military equipment, and now surpasses the Russian Armed Forces 
in number and technology regarding the conventional forces. This change in power positions is a 
concern for the Russian military. The second issue in national security for Russia is the nuclear 
question. China has maintained a secrecy around the number of  her nuclear arsenal, and 
controversy has emerged as to her capacity to conduct a retaliatory strike. This, plus Beijing’s refusal 
to engage in arms control negotiations, is a source of  worry for Russia’s national security, as the 
nuclear dissuasion is a fundamental part of  the Russian security strategy. The Russian Far East 
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region is a historical point of  tension in the Sino-Russian security relations. The economic 
underdevelopment of  the region, its economic dependence on Chinese investments and the energy 
question make it a strategic region for Russia’s security. The evolution of  the situation there is 
particularly important for the future of  the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. The final security 
concern from the Russian government is the issue of  territorial claims. Both China and Russia have 
remained neutral in each other’s territorial claims, but the growing asymmetry between the two 
countries may make difficult for Russia to not support more China’s position in the South China 
Sea dispute, especially that the Kremlin’s neutrality has raised criticism among Chinese observers. 
Finally, China’s internal situation has also raised concerns in Moscow, as the situation in Hong 
Kong and Xinjiang generate instability in their respective regions. 
The last intervening variable are the security issues in Central Asia. As for now, Russia and 
China have managed to manage the security of  the region collectively within the SCO framework. 
However, Russia was already forced to make concessions to focus more about economics in the 
SCO, and about the collaboration between the EEU and the OBOR project. Russia preserves 
apprehensions about China’s presence in Central Asia and tries to conduct there a multi-vector 
policy to counterbalance the Chinese predomination is the region, which is a part of  Russia’s Near 
Abroad. 
The future evolution of  the Sino-Russian military relations is still open for questions. This 
will depend on the evolution of  the international situation, particularly on how the US-China and 
US-Russia relations evolve. The three great powers form a strategic triangle in which any changes 
between two of  the members impact the others. To maintain their military relations at a good level, 
Russia and China will also have to manage the security issues mentioned above, as they will 
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